Six years on, Kyrgyzstan is still at risk of inter-group violence and genuine reconciliation seems like a distant finish line. Tensions remain high between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the country’s southern regions, and border skirmishes with neighbouring Uzbekistan aren’t improving the present state of affairs. International organizations warn that Kyrgyz nationalism is gaining force, and that it could possibly contribute to yet another violent outbreak. But have the country’s nationalist forces been misunderstood, and is it in fact through them that Kyrgyzstan will find peace? International Crisis Group stated recently that the Kyrgyz situation “should remain a conflict-prevention priority”, while establishing augmenting nationalism and failure to foster political inclusion as factors which currently contribute to the country’s precarious status quo. The international organization has repeatedly pin-pointed the fact that Kyrgyz nationalism is intensifying, and above all, that political elites are doing little to combat this troubling trend. Instead, it seems like politicians are quenching (and fuelling) this right-wing thirst by incorporating nationalist ideas in their political projects. In February this year, a new nationalist party, United Opposition Force of Kyrgyzstan, was formed by prominent political figures from the southern, most violence-plagued regions of the country. This is where the most intense inter-group violence took place six years ago, in June 2010, when Kyrgyzstan saw hundreds of people, mostly Uzbeks (a minority group in Kyrgyzstan), being killed within a few terror-stricken days. Now, more than half a decade later, the aftershocks still linger, and numerous root causes of the violence seem to persist. Although the majority of the victims in the June violence were Uzbeks, this group is overrepresented among those pointed out as perpetrators by Kyrgyz law enforcement in the aftermath of the events. Many of those who looted and subsequently took over Uzbek owned shops and businesses haven’t been prosecuted, similarly, law enforcement agencies haven’t been widely held accountable for their failure to protect Uzbeks during the violence. What happened in June 2010 was horrific, but it received little media attention in Europe – if any. This is peculiar, given the scope and intensity of the violence and Kyrgyzstan’s proximity to the closely observed Afghanistan. I found the lack of coverage intriguing and in 2013 I finished my research paper on the post-conflict reconstruction process in Kyrgyzstan. Reconstructing divided cities In the wake of the 2010 violence, several reconstruction projects arose, among which, one that explicitly aimed to physically “build away” the causes of ethnic tension between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the country’s southern regions caught my full attention. My term paper, “Reconstructing to what? Urban Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy in Southern Kyrgyzstan”, specifically examined to which extent identity and minority issues were addressed and disregarded in the post-conflict reconstruction process of two southern Kyrgyz cities: Osh and Jalalabad. As a result of my findings, I argued that urban planning policies should be considered an integral part of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts, given their enormous potential for local ownership in post-conflict reconstruction projects. Following the violence, the Kyrgyz authorities claimed that the traditional Uzbek housing (mahallas) and the neighborhoods they form, were among the root causes of the June events. Consequently, the government announced that so-called “multi-ethnic apartment buildings” would be constructed in order to prevent future outbreaks of inter-group violence. This initiative was ultimately a failure. In the end, the majority of the residents were Kyrgyz and the housing project seemed more like a solution to Osh’s overall crowdedness, rather than an honest attempt at restoring victims’ homes. Is nationalism necessary for nation-building? Given this background, I have viewed the nationalist Kyrgyz movement the same way as many other foreign spectators: as a negative force that's hindering positive drivers of conflict transformation can. Interestingly, there are scholars who argue that Kyrgyz nationalism has been widely misunderstood by foreign analysts, and that nationalism could actually be a source of conflict transformation in itself. One of them is Nick Megoran, a researcher with Newcastle University in the UK. Megoran studies political geographies and the construction of nation-states in Central Asian countries, he’s conducted research on Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for organizations like Chatham House and Stockholm Institute of Peace Research (SIPRI). He maintains that Kyrgyz nationalism has been misinterpreted by the international community and that nationalism in the country must be seen as part of the wider nation-building project, rather than only as a destructive element in Kyrgyz politics. “[Nationalism] should not be understood as an inherently negative force, but rather an ambiguous ideology that divides and excludes while also being inseparable from the rise of modern democracy and welfare states. Nationalist politics can be inclusive or exclusionary of minorities,” Nick Megoran argues in a Chatham House programme paper on Kyrgyz nationalism, published in 2012. He stresses that just peace in Kyrgyzstan’s southern region will not be achieved unless the core issues that nurture Kyrgyz nationalism are resolved. Among these, we find Kyrgyz fears of perceived geopolitical threats. For instance, the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, a frontline which in many ways lacks clear geographical definition, oftentimes experience inter-state quarrels. Recently, both countries advanced militarily in the region – at least in part – over a dispute regarding the Orto-Tokoy water reservoir, which has been a source of conflict between the neighbouring countries since Soviet times. “Everybody is worried. This is a problem between the two governments, but it is the residents that suffer. Again they are raising ethnic issues. They cannot divide up the border, and the population is stuck in the middle. Personally, I’m afraid. You can feel the tension,” Dilfura Ismailova, resident of the contested area, said to a group of Kyrgyz journalists that traveled through the region in late March this year. These inter-state strains can be understood through a Kyrgyz nationalist perspective, where external geopolitical threats become intertwined with perceived internal ones. “Uzbeks (or at least their elites) are seen to represent a fundamental existential threat to the state, because they are perceived to be aligned to external powers and not investing in the national project of unity,” Megoran writes. “[…] the Uzbek minority will not be safe until the Kyrgyz themselves feel that Kyrgyzstan is safe,” he continues. Hence, according to Megoran, guaranteeing Kyrgyz territorial integrity is a fundamental cornerstone in order to ensure the safety of the country’s Uzbek minority. Moreover, Megoran argues that these feelings of insecurity go beyond geography, and that the Kyrgyz feel as if important parts of their nation are in danger. Kyrgyz language, for instance, didn’t have a standardized alphabet before the country became part of the Soviet Union. Additionally, as was the case in many Post-Soviet countries, Russian language dominated Kyrgyz social life. Subsequently, the question of Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek language has since become an issue tightly embedded at the core of the country’s nation-building project. I hadn’t understood how serious the question of language is in Kyrgyzstan, until I read Megoran’s report. He mentions an incident, where the head of OSCE’s office in Kyrgyzstan made a public statement in favour of Uzbek language inclusion, something which by many Kyrgyz was interpreted as OSCE showing support for Uzbek “separatism”. According to Megoran, Kyrgyzstan, fears that its southern region is trying to break away, and that it will turn into a scenario similar to what happened in Kosovo, where, from a Kyrgyz nationalist point of view, Western countries facilitated Kosovo's independence. Perhaps the fears are understandable, given the country's rather short history as a sovereign nation-state. But then again, there is of course the question of whether nationalism can be something positive at all, and moreover, can it be inclusive of minorities? Perhaps, national unity would be a more adequate term, or a sense of national belonging. For how can Uzbeks feel united with Kyrgyz in a nation-building project that aims to uphold and mould only a Kyrgyz ideal? Although nationalism is seldom understood as including minorities, Megoran mentions that it can, in theory, be an inclusive ideology. But then again, there is of course the question of whether nationalism can be something positive at all, and moreover, can it be inclusive of minorities? The Kyrgyz nation-building project could then be steered towards a “nationalism” that sees the nation-state as a space and place for several minorities, a more diverse take on the traditional “one people-one state” nationalist idea. Interestingly, Megoran studies how nationalist responses to the June violence, such as the building of Kyrgyz national monuments in Osh “are grounded in the idea that inter-ethnic peace in Osh is to be guaranteed through unity by creating loyalty to a strong state with a clear Kyrgyz character and ideology.” In order for Kyrgyzstan to achieve genuine stability and advance in its reconciliation efforts, it seems as if the nationalist idea must be addressed and perhaps redesigned as to include the country’s minorities. Also, impunity and lack of accountability are two other concrete factors that continue to cause instability. Open Society Foundation’s Jacqueline Hale has argued that “A stable future in Kyrgyzstan depends on citizens being able to seek redress and remedy through courts independent of political pressure, and civil society must be able to enter into a dialogue with the government on these issues, rather than speaking into the void.” International involvement in reconciliation efforts In a SIPRI working paper from 2014, Megoran and his colleagues establish that the majority of the reconciliation programmes where funded by three main Western sponsors: the European Union, USA and the UN. Additionally, they found that the donors mainly supported “short term reconciliation and mediation projects with a minor development component.” In other words, programmes that did little in order to address the root causes of the violence (for instance unemployment and perceived inequality between groups) and create a basis for long-term peace in the region. The research group reached several conclusive recommendations. Firstly, they suggest that peacebuilding efforts in Kyrgyzstan should focus on the “demographic groups directly involved in perpetrating violence”, i.e. young unemployed men from so-called “mono-ethnic” neighbourhoods. Which seems like a recommendation they shouldn’t have to make, it should be obvious. Apart from that, the authors argue that the political instability that forewent the June violence in 2010, was possibly one of the core triggers to the events. Subsequently, they establish that Western actors should pay attention to their entire involvement and wider impact in the region and in Kyrgyzstan. Meaning, that they must recognize their role in acerbating the political events and turmoil of April 2010. Consequently, it seems as if nationalism is more an effect than an underlying cause in this case, and to some extent also a coping mechanism, from a Kyrgyz perspective. If we consider the recommendations made in the SIPRI paper, it also becomes quite clear that although the international community, and in particular Western donors, are key investors in peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan, their understanding of the conflict causes and their own role – both the actual and the one perceived by the Kyrgyz – is flawed. Photos: Save the Children & Sofia Skrypnyk / Flickr Creative Commons. Julie David de Lossy - ICG / Twitter
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |